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JUDICIAL METHOD OF INTERPRETATION OF CODES
Carlos de la Vega Benayas*
INTRODUCTION: THE AFFINITY

AMONG LEGAL SYSTEMS

I realize that the topic of this paper is quite general and broad
and that it is addressed to an audience which includes persons living
under a legal system where the concept of a particularsystem is not
well defined. The state of Louisiana, nevertheless, does belong to a
certain category of systems in which the application of the law approximates that of the Continental, European, or, according to Louisiana
jurists, civil law, under which the concept of a systematic and ordered
legal whole is predominant. Whether such a concept constitutes an
established idea or a belief is debatable, particularly when one keeps
in mind the fact that the notion of a system does not always signify
one that is closed, or restricted, and inflexibly logical and reasonable.
System and systematic, order and ordered-these are not the same.
Even the most open, or expansive, juridical system possesses an internal coherence, a prevailing logic and a functional interdependency
among its parts, from which can be drawn a rational methodology,
a systematic meaning. In my opinion, an objective examination of all
legal systems would reveal no more differences than the relative mixtures that are already known to exist. Regardless of some of the
parallels and comparisons that have been drawn between legal systems, and especially between the common law and civil law, differences
and contrasts do exist and the methods used for the realization and
application of the law are clearly not the same, although the ultimate
goal is: to achieve justice in each case. It is also clear that the Continental judge do~s not perform his task in the same way that the
Anglo-Saxon judge does. The reasons for this are well known-they
include, for example, factors of a social, political, psychological, and
economic nature. What should be important is whether or not each
society, each nation is satisfied with its system, techniques, and
methods for the realization of the law.
The common origin of the legal orders or systems under discussion is the Roman law which, along with its architecture, has been
noted as Rome's fundamental contribution to contemporary civilization and culture. Rome, it has also been said, is the mother of the
law and the state.
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The Roman law, with the least possible amount of legislationthe formal positive law contained in the Twelve Tables (5th century
B.C.)-developed into a veritable juridical mosaic founded on opinions
(responsa prudentium), resolutions, and judgments derived from individual cases or conflicts. The realization of the law in Rome did not
proceed from an application and interpretation of codes, which at that
time did not exist, but from a case-by-case development of justice.
An aggrieved party went first to the praetor, who granted or
denied his right to bring an action, and then to the iudex, who
rendered a judgment granting or denying the party's right to obtain
relief. The Roman law is judicial law, a doctrinal elaboration (by jurist
consults) and a judicial resolution of conflicts that began with the
literal application of rules and agreements during the formative period,
that progressed to a search for a way to introduce fairness, good sense,
and natural reason into the resolution of cases (ius honorarium, as
for instance, the causa Curiana which was the first interpretative
device used to balance the harshness of the strict interpretation of
testaments), and ended with the Justinian period, marked by a desire
to apply the law on the basis of a plain and literal interpretation of
codes, which were integrated into the Corpusjuris civilis. Justinian's
dream, apparently, was to convert all law into an inflexible monument that would be the source of resolutions for all conflicts, and he
thus prohibited any commentaries, gloss, or interpretation of his code.
The similarity in the development of the English law is obvious.
In the Middle Ages the English magistrate, like the Roman praetor,
granted and denied the right to bring suit, or institute process. Later
on, to mitigate the effects of the literal interpretation of the common
law, and the strict adherence to precedent (stare decisis), the courts
of equity developed, and their role is today manifested in the tendency
toward excessive legislating, a necessity of modern and technical society. This proliferation of statutes (law in the continental sense) will
inevitably necessitate codification, a demand that history bears out
and needs no elaboration.
The law of the continental European countries, also, has experienced a similar evolution. During the High Middle Ages the Roman
law influence was quite great, and it was during this period that the
Glossators undertook the task of explaining the most important legal
texts, but with strict regard for their literal meaning. Later, the Commentators initiated the movement toward greater independence in the
interpretation of legal texts, thus giving rise to a new form of doctrine. Finally, the laws of the various nations became diversified and
formed a disjointed but related set of norms, some of which were
taken from the Roman law, others from Germanic law, many from
the decrees of the king, and most from the so-called uses and customs
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(customary law). Justice was first administered by the king and his
officials and then by judges and courts under the protection of a law
that was not fixed or codified, acquiring thereby great power, as under
the French judicial parlements, whose conservatism in the exercise
of that independence is listed among the causes of the French Revolution, inspired, also, by the teachings of Montesquieu who, copying badly from the English system, argued that in order to avoid judicial
arbitrariness the judge should be no more than the voice which pronounces the words of the law, a lifeless being which cannot control
its own force and vigor.
The idea or goal, as in the time of Justinian, was to give the judge,
and the applier of the law in general, a legal text, so to speak, perfect
and complete, anticipating absolutely all cases that life could possibly
offer. Not even Portalis, the renowned redactor, believed that this
was possible; but, such faith in reason and security converted reasonable men into deluded ones.
The direct purpose of the civil code and other laws was to prohibit interpretation (since if everything was in the code, it did not
need to be interpreted) and to establish an appellate court as a watchman to insure that judges adhered strictly to the written law. There
is no need to explain how life itself silenced the dream of a selfsufficient law and how the very essence of the judicial function
transformed a court that originally had only one political missionthe defense of the law (ius constitutionis)- into an entity that integrated the ultimate jurisdictional phase, or the maximum judicial
authority, the court becoming in a sense a court of last instance or
resort (ius litigatoris). The clearest example of a court which has
undergone this sort of evolution, if such clarity is possible, is the
Supreme Court of Spain.
With this brief overview, I draw only the conclusion that there
is an essential affinity among all legal systems, and among the phases
of their evolutions, with some systems being restricted, or closed, and
others expansive, or open, toward other perspectives. What ultimately
distinguishes some human groups from others are their customs, using
this word in a very broad and general sense. By concentrating on
our immediate focus-the juridical system-there is little question
about its ultimate end: to realize a just legal order, where diversity
will be so satisfactory that the uniformity could not prevent us from
believing that perhaps in the not-too-distant future our juridical worlds
will approximate one another. An example of this is the international
tendency to draw closer together and formulate uniform laws in
private, civil, and commercial law matters, such as those proposed
for the European Community. In a general way, this is reminiscent
of Toynbee's belief that no European nation has a history that is completely intelligible by itself.
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THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE

It is understood that in every legal system there is a proper
methodology which distinguishes the various fields from one another
in their common pursuit of the realization of the law: (1) the method
of the creation and formulation of the sources of the law, (2) the
method of understanding, or knowing, the law, and (3) the method
of applying the law. The first refers to the origin and development
of the particular class of norms, or rules, that make up the legal
system, its parts, and internal hierarchy: laws, customs, principles,
equity, jurisprudence, and other extra-legal or extra-positive norms.
The second refers to knowledge, or appreciation, of the law in a philisophical sense; whether it be doctrinal or scientific, for example: the
philosophy of law, the science of law, the methodology of the science
of law. The last refers to the practical realization of the law through
the work of jurists, lawyers, legal officials, and arbiters and, fundamentally through the judicial function, which consumates and determines
the law, stating what the law is or is not in each conflict in vivo,
and not in in vitro. Of these areas, only the first and third will be
discussed here.
The Sources of Law in Spain
It is necessary at this point to review a bit more extensively the
comments made earlier concerning the origin and development of
juridical norms in relation to the existing legal system, or legal order.
The development of the sources of law, or more precisely, the historic
origin of norms, of the Spanish system sprang from a mixture and
juxtaposition of elements: some that were indigenous, some that were
German, others that came from the French (i.e., their civil code), as
well as some from the influence of the Roman law, upon which the
French law is substantially based, and, finally, others that resulted
from the development of the Spanish law, which was actually a reception of the first mentioned element. All of this, however, was not accomplished in a unified way, nor did judges become true legal organs,
until the 19th century. Essentially, Spanish law was a mixture of indigenous and foreign elements. Not only did Roman, German, and
canon law, with its compilations of written law, coexist, but they more
or less absorbed local customs and uses as well. The existence of
Roman law codes gave way to Spanish-Roman codes, culminating with
the 13th-century Fuero Juzgo, which remained in force until the promulgation of the C6digo civil in 1889. These earlier codes, however,
were not codes in the modern sense, and they comprised a variety
of juridical orders or systems. Later came the compilations and summaries, such as: the Fuero Real (1255), the Espeulo, the Siete Partidas (1250), this being the superior legal, and literary, monument and

19821

INTERPRETATION of CODES

1647

an authentic summary of Spanish-Roman law, the Ordenamiento de
Alcald (1348), the Leyes de Toro (1505), the Nueva Recopilaci6n (1567),
and the Novisima Recopilaci6n (1805). This brief overview alone reveals
a reality different from that usually presented, one which is quite
simplistic. This is so even without a review of the varied, unsystematic,
and diffuse judicial organization of that period, which witnessed the
appearance of "free-willed" judges, governed only by customs and their
own discretion, and during which all judges and courts, through the
application of those laws and summaries, employed a sophisticated
procedural system, taken primarily from canonical, Italian, and national law and being for the most part written, whose intricacies were
harshly criticized by the great classical writers, such as Quevedo and
.Cervantes. That is to say, the juridical-judicial reality was not exactly
uniform and, of course, the law, understood as a general norm promulgated by the political-legislative authority, was not the predominant
source of law.
The Spanish Codification
As a result of all this, the interpretation and application of the
law could not be accomplished according to a uniform criterion nor
did judges and courts follow one particular deductive method suitable
to codified legislation. The situation was typified by contradictory interpretations, uncontrolled discretions, an anarchical system of judicial
recourse due to the lack of an orderly procedural system, the mediocre
organization of the court, and the overlapping of jurisdictions, etc.
The reaction to this state of affairs gave impetus to the codification
movement in Spain, although such a movement had begun throughout
continental Europe as a whole toward the end of the 18th century.
It is well known that the theory and practice of the civil law in
Europe, i.e., the private civil law as opposed to public law, a law
predominantly casuistical and jurisprudential in origin, sought a perfectionism of the system that would serve not only the ends of juridical
certitude, but also the ends of a better understanding, or comprehension, of the law, including its pedagogical goals. It was believed that
the dispersion of norms, or rules, lent itself to confusion. These beliefs,
as has been pointed out, manifested themselves during the High Middle Ages and during modern times as well. Analogous, though not
exactly, is the notion underlying the North American Restatement, a
sort of summary of doctrine and the principles derived in judicial cases
and decisions. But, as one knows, a summary is not a code, for the
latter is linked to certain fundamental ideas and purposes, such as
rationalism, systematization, thematic unity, and regulation of norms,
while the former is merely a juxtaposition, a summary of rules and
norms of varied juridical content. The first codes deserving of that
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designation are the Code Napoleon (1804) and the Austrian Civil Code
of 1811. The Code Napoleon, of course, had the greatest influence,
affecting the Dutch, Spanish, Italian, and Egyptian codes, we well as
various Central and South American codes and, in particular, the civil
codes of Louisiana and Quebec. (The Swiss, and especially the German,
codes are considered excessively technical and will be cited only sparingly in the comparisons made in this work). In Spain, the codification movement of the 19th century began in 1812 under the Court
of Cadiz and culminated, in matters of private law, with the promulgation of the Civil Code of 1889. This does not mean, of course, that
the entire civil law of Spain is contained in that code, for there are
numerous ancillary laws and statutes that regulate important private
law matters.
The idea of integrating all normative legal material into a unitary
body, or work, does not only respond to a rationalist conception or
mental predisposition as was pointed earlier, but it responds also to
a practical, pragmatic purpose-to avoid juridical insecurity. It should
be remembered that security and justice, as juridical values or general
principles, are dialetically complimentary and are not, in a Manichean
fashion, opposed to each other. The insecurity sought to be avoided
is that arising from the diversity of scattered norms, from the dubious
value and effectiveness of such diversity, and from the contradictory
judicial application of those norms.
To say that codification leads to a cumulative and complete
hermetism would be fallacious-a simplification sometimes encountered
with political drafters, as opposed to juristic ones. Today in continental Europe, it is recognized and understood that codes do not contain
all the law. Codification has not closed, or restricted, the system.
Juridical reality, today, is characterized by the existence of a varied
and diverse normative whole constituting the so-called "block of legality," whose highest norms (the constitution, the preliminary title of
the civil code, the laws establishing public bodies, and administrative
laws) create an order or hierarchy which, in the application of those
laws, is intimately linked to the principle of legality and is immersed
in the juridical-political structure of the state. The fundamental idea
underlying the concept of the state conforming to the law is the limitation of power, and the cause and origin of this limitation is the security
of the individual's liberty and dignity, of his autonomy within certain
just limits, which are likewise established by the law. This concept
of the state was developed during the last third of the 19th century
and, in a technical juridical sense, is a contribution made by the Germans, that is, in respect to the notion of the state's submission to
the law. The social and political elements, however, are in the English
political tradition (the limitation of power) and are, also, the result
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of the concept's peculiar reception by French doctrinal writers and
revolutionaries, as reflected in the North American revolution (declaration of rights, separation of powers, and, later on, judicial control of
the law and administration). Evolved from the French revolutionary
experience is the notion that the state and its organs should act within
the limits of legislation and the law, properly speaking, as a guaranty
of the right of the individual, who ceases to be a passive subject and
becomes a citizen and participant in the power. This submission of
the state to the law rests on the principles of legality: the submission
of all state organs to a regulated and standard order emanating from
the collective legitimating will. The principle of legality, called the
principle of principles and being one of the bases of the concept of
the state conforming to the law, signifies that all acts and all norms
are subjected to a just juridical and social order, but not simply to
any order, as pointed out in Articles 1 and 9 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. The latter article provides: "The citizens and the public
authorities are subject to the Constitution and all other laws." This
subjection to the law logically extends first to the judges and the
courts; but, this subjection of judges to the principles of legality does
not have to be understood as a blind, bureaucratic obedience to the
words of the law and only the law. In the first place, the law should
be one that reflects the superior principles of the Constitution, that
is to say, a law which is not contrary to or deviates from the Constitution. If the law is unconstitutional, the court, through the judge,
will respond to the situation. If the law is one that is actually not
in force, it will not be applied. If the law is not appropriate, a different source of norms, or rules, will be examined.
Indicated in a precise manner in Article 1 of the Civil Code: "The
sources of the Spanish legal order are written law, custom and the
general principles of law." Thus, the sources are presented according
to the following hierarchy: written law is first; in its absence, custom
is applied; and, in its absence, the general principles are applied, but
with the solemn warning, contained in the same article, that judges
have a duty to resolve, or decide, every case-a prohibition of non
liquet.
One might therefore wonder what goal has been achieved by the
aspiration of manifesting unity in codes. In other words, what end
has been accomplished if one moves from the separation and dispersion of norms (as opposed to the dispersion of legislation) the codification, unification, and'simplification, and then, as though by round trip,
back to the coexistence of multiple and diffuse norms? The goal is
this: a very humane aspiration in which logic and security are allied.
The purpose is to furnish the citizen and those who apply the law
with a clearer legal order and to provide the judge with a mechanicism
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by which he can achieve a justice that is more equal (the principle
of equality) and a more secure (the principle of security) in relation
to all human conduct.
This aspiration presupposes, therefore, that if, in a country where
the civil law is codified, there also exists codes containing other classes
of norms, then the effect becomes twofold. On the one hand, the civil
code does not contain all the law in force. On the other hand, the
art and technique of rendering judicial decisions (officium judicis) is
not as simple an operation as some have claimed, nor can its limits
be defined only in reference to the Continental or civil law system
as others have maintained.
THE DEPTH AND LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

At this point, one may safely conclude that the judicial method
if interpretation of codes, that is, the application of the law in Continental systems, cannot be described by simply indicating the classic
methods for the interpretation of norms or rule of law. Article 3 of
Spanish Civil Code exemplifies this: "The rules of law shall be interpreted according to the exact sense of their words, in relation to the
context, the historic and legislative antecedents and the social reality
of the time at which they are to be applied, with fundamental attention being given to their spirit and purpose." To this, which is itself
a rule concerning the interpretation of rules (thus different from a
rule that interprets another rule), there must be added the notion
of equity in the task of interpretation, or which cooperates in interpretation, in accordance with the meanings pointed out in paragraph
2 of Article 3 of the Civil Code: "equity shall be pondered in the application of rules." The paradox is clear that a rule given for the interpretation of rules is, because of its own obscurity, subject to interpretation. But, this is the destiny of all laws, in spite of the infantile
prohibitions to the contrary. In this sense, a profound historic change
has taken place. There has been a shift from the sharp prohibition
against interpretation by judges to the clear mandate that they participate in the realization of the law. It is interesting to note, however,
the inverse dialictic relation between authoritarianism and autocracy,
on the one hand, and judicial independence, on the other-the more
authoritarian the power, the less freedom there is for the interpreter.
Since the Spanish Civil Code itself adds in Article 4 the possibility of resorting to analogy, and since the articles referred to are contained in the portion of the Code concerning "application of the law"
(in Chapter II), the conclusion is clear that the legislature intended
to establish a narrow and concise system for the application of the
law, comprising not only the subject of interpretation, but the integration of norms, that is, the delicate task of filling "gaps." It is therefore
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correct to speak of the method of applying rules, and not of interpreting codes. This is so because, in truth, interpretation is no more
than one part of the overall application of the law. This is so, also,
because the judge in a country of codified law, as a result of the existence of a variety of norms, does not limit himself only to an interpretation of the code, but to an application of norms, or rules, according, of course, to the guidelines established by the general rules of
the code, but also with the possibility or obligation of having to apply,
as subsidiary norms or rules, other norms not found in the codecustom, general principles of law, or jurisprudence affirmed by the
Supreme Court. This latter, in turn, not only includes the uniform
or repeated interpretation of legislative norms (i.e., codes and statutes),
but also integrates extra-legal, or extra-positive, principles and norms
(e.g., from natural law and equity). It is through this process, or in
this way, that an actual, living law is born of judicial disputes and
formally penetrates the legal system of a country.
Here lies the difference between the common law and civil lawthat the foundation of the judicial function rests in the laws, whether
codified or not, since "codification" in this context represents only
a formal statement of the law, in light of the fact that there are ancillary laws not incorporated into the code. The supremacy of the written law is consecrated in the Constitution and in the C6digo civil itself,
through the articles mentioned earlier. The Anglo-Saxon system of
precedent, stare decisis, is not in force in our country.
When presented with a conflict, the judge-in accordance with
the parties' allegation of facts and citations of applicable rulessearches, in a sense, the normative horizon of positive and written
rules (whether or not they are contained in a formal code) for the
rule that is properly applicable to the facts of the case. If the proposed and "proved facts" of the case fit comfortably into the rule selected
as being applicable, or adequate, the double task of subsumption and
application is easy. Obviously there is no need to resort to additional
sources or to make further inquiries. It is possible, and this is normally done in the Spanish courts, to add to the mere examination
of the rule other arguments ex abundantia,whether they are doctrinal
or scientific in nature (absent, of course, any identification of the
writers) or whether they are jurisprudential in nature, by citing a
Supreme Court decision or statement on a similar subject, which
always gives more authority to the holding and provides it with a
more solid base, but which does not constitute, as in the common law,
a ratio decidendi for the holding unless the decision is sustained only
in the jurisprudence. (It is interesting to recall that, during the 18th
century under the reign of Charles III, judges were prohibited from
giving reasons for their decisions, in order to avoid confusing the parties and citing varied and contradictory theories).
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Let us suppose, for this is usually the case, that the proper settlement of the opposing interests is found in a rule from the Civil
Code or some ancillary statute. What, really, is the function of the
judge and the methodology he is to use? The answer would be simple
if one could still believe, as did those of an earlier time who perceived
the judge's task as a 'simple subsumption, a mere syllogism: law being the major premise, the facts and claims being the minor premise,
and the holding being the conclusion. Reality now, as then, is different,
and there is no need to expose the reader to a discussion of the history
of doctrinal evolution other than briefly to recall that the school of
jurisprudence of interests, the free law, the sociology of American
realism, etc. attempted to develop what judges in reality follow-a
true syncretic technique without making it the slave of a particular
doctrine or dogma, but these movements failed to take juridical conceptualism into account. In other words, the proponents of this technique forgot that the technique must operate by concepts, which according to Ihering and Windscheid are obtained by the interpreter
of the law, for the perfection of the system and that those concepts
are elaborated by the construction of juridical logic according to the
positive law, and thus lacks any gaps.
Up to the time of the holding, the process is complex, and not
at all simple. A brief discussion will show this. First, I included in
one of my books the following inscription. "Man, plus norm, plus fact:
That is what I understand by law." Man in this instance is the judge,
the agent or organ, with all his human qualities, both positive and
negative, that arise from his educational, social, and cultural surroundings. The judge realizes that he must "jump" (for the philosophers,
somersault) from the facts to the rule, or norm-from what is to what
ought to be-and produce as a result the law. For this, it is necessary
to admit that the law is not one of the three, but all of them in a
logical union. The facts are not the law, as the Scandinavian Realist
School and some Anglo-Saxon writers would have it. The rule is not
the law, as the normative positivists or the conceptualists maintain.
The law is not the judge, as many renowned North American judges
would have it, the words of Holmes being illustrative: "Law is what
judges do."
The rules are given, or exist, for the facts; however, facts without
normative regulation would have no social efficacy, but would be a
mere phenomenon. Both rules and facts need a human bridge, a
speaker, someone to pronounce and declare the law (iuris dictio)that bridge is the judge, the jurisdiction of the court.
The judge finds himself before the facts; he does not search for
or "find" them, but is offered them by the parties, or litigants.
However, the facts that the judge contemplates in order to deter-
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mine the application of the rule are not simple facts, originally pure
at the time they were produced, but facts that have undergone a long
process of qualitative and quantitative elaboration of human significations, that is to say, that flesh has been added to their bare bones
(just as with the historian's task), and this process is brought about
by the parties, their attorneys, and, in the end, by the judge who,
after evaluating the "proved facts," determines them and gives them
meaning. In other words, in spite of what is commonly believed, the
'facts are also interpreted, hence the decisive importance of the proof
of the facts and, even more so, their appreciation by the judge. The
judge will respect the facts, certainly, by virtue of his duty of impartiality and objectivity. But in the judge's task, which is his responsibility, there is also that of determining the facts, once appraised
and evaluated. In this sense, the appellate judges realize the extraordinary importance of that determinationof fact executed by the trial
judge. Only in very exceptional instances can that determination, the
judge's weighing of the evidence, be challenged before the Supreme
Court on the basis of an error of fact or law.
Viewed in this way, it is obvious that there can be no automation
in the decision, because, before entering upon the interpretation and
determination of the rule, the judge has decided upon the facts and,
thus, the facts so decided upon can be integrated, subsumed, into the
facts contemplated in the applicable rule, what the Germans refer to
as "tatbestand," the Italians, "fattispecie,"and the English, "operative
facts."
This not only signifies that there is not automation in the decision, but also that the rule itself will not become operative nor binding, since the rule is not an absolute source, but a tentative one. This
is so because the judge, in effect, always has in mind, or presupposes,
the result of the rule-the consequence, or result, that points to the
facts or tatbestand that is believed to be applicable-and because not
only must this conclusion be elaborated, but so must the premises
(the facts by virtue of their determination after the proof; the facts
contemplated by the applicable rule as a result of interpretation). The
outcome is that the judge actually recreates, or reconstructs the law,
since he sets with his conduct (his technique and art) the other data
and elements that the legislator did not see, because he could not,
not because he did not want to, of course. Is there much difference,
therefore, between the civil law judge and the Anglo-Saxon judge who
must make the facts of the case substantially analogous to the precedent case as the ratio decidendi? It seems not. It may be reasonable
to suppose that the subjection of the English judge to precedent could
be harder, more automatic than the Continental judge's subjection
to the legal rule (found in the code or in statutes). Without being con-
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vinced of this, I will leave the matter for someone else to investigate,
but I do note that the courts of equity were created to lessen that
harshness.
The judicial recreation of the law which occurs when the judge
applies a positive norm (written law, custom, jurisprudentially recognized principles, or general principles existing within the legal system
of the country) is converted into a creation when the judge is confronted with a gap and when he must, by command of the law which
requires that a decision be rendered in every case (Civ. Code arts.
1 & 7), look to another norm, or rule, not included within the formal
sources of law just mentioned. This situation will be discussed later,
however.
The facts being determined by means of the proof and their
judicial appreciation (in the Spanish system there is no predetermined
weight given to any evidence, an approach previously valued by the
law, and free judicial weighing of the evidence exists except in a very
few instances), the judge must begin the task of interpreting the rule.
The interpretation of the rule, however, presupposes that an applicable positive rule of law exists, because the judge has already tentatively chosen the rule that he considers to be applicable and, if the
rule invoked by the parties is the correct one, the judge, in general,
should not alter the proposed legal foundation. This also carries over
in the judge's other mental processes: (1) establishing that the rule
is in force and has not been repealed, (2) verifying that it accords
with the Constitution, which is the law of laws, (3) verifying that it
does not contradict a rule of higher rank or a principle of justice (in
an extreme case doctrine admits that an unjust law, one that is contradictary to, for example, human dignity, will not be applicable), (4)
assuring the operation of the principle of the hierarch of norms, which
is pointed out in the Constitution and the Civil Code according to
the following order: the Constituion, laws establishing public bodies,
ordinary laws, legislative decrees, law-decrees, ministerial decrees and
orders, and this must be done without prejudice to the system of the
principal sources of law-written law, custom, and general principles,
and (5) resolving any possible antinomy with another rule of equal
rank.
After the rule has been judicially selected and determined, there
follows the task of finding its meaning and signification and of determining if those correspond to the facts already tried and determined
by the judge. This is interpretation in the strict sense. It must be
pointed out that this is not an isolated task, but that it is carried
out in the judge's mind in conjunction with the other tasks and is
accomplished not only as an intellectual process, but also as one influenced by emotions, the latter referring to what Judge Hutcheson
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calls a "hunch." It is possible, and it does in fact happen, although
nothing is said about it (because of the legal hyprocrisy of which Hegel
speaks), that the judge denies a claim because of a moral conviction
and then injects legal reasons into the decision. Because of this, it
has been claimed that the "legal reasons" in an opinion are lies,
pretexts.
The interpretation of the law is not predetermined by any one
of the usual methods. Savigny delineated the most classic and familar
ones: literal, historical, logical, and systematic. Later, others were added by doctrine and jurisprudence: telelogical, sociological, systematic,
analogical, etc. This last one should be distinguished from analogy
as a method of integration through a search for another rule by reason
of a substantial identity between the facts of the new situation and
the meaning of the rule that the judge intends to apply, obtaining
thereby a sub-rule.
All of these methods of interpretation are contained in Article
3 of the Spanish Civil Code, transcribed above, and have been recognized by the Supreme Court. That rule does allow the possibility of
the judge's resorting to that method which he deems appropriate.
There is no written mandate, only admonition and advice. What happens (and the rule does not lack force or consequences because of
it) is that, if the judge poorly or incorrectly uses one of those methods,
his decision can be reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court. Those
methods are the literal, the historical, the sociological, and the telelogical.
It is clear that literal interpretation follows the words of the text
when they give rise to no doubts: ino claris non fit interpretatio.Actually, this constitutes only a rhetorical statement, since to declare
that a text is clear presupposes that it has already been interpreted,
that its meaning has been examined. The circumstances by which a
text can be seized with obscurity are many, but, because of space
limitations, they will not be discussed here.
The logical method or approach is derived from the coherence and
internal systematization of the code or statute. Its object is to relate
one rule with another by reason of its belonging to a group, a set,
or an order, considering it, not as a part, but as a whole, such as
is stated in the Digest (1.3.24): "nisi tota lege perspecta." Here is found
the problem of antinomies or internal contradictions in the system,
which are not infrequent in spite of the legislator's claims to the contrary. One of the conflicting rules will be selected, the non liquet rejected. The judge will be the one to decide.
The historical method is used when a rule is interpreted with
respect to its history, its antecedents, and the circumstances which
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gave rise to it. This method is linked to the ancient theory of the
legislator's will, or intent, at the moment the rule was established,
which can clash with reality. Obviously, as the Spanish Civil Code
advises, the choice should be made in favor of "the social reality of
the time when they [the rules] are to be applied," taking into account
the sociological criteria which the Code consecrates (art. 3(1)). Rules
exist, age, and erode with the changes in society. The legislator cannot be continually adapting them. This is the judge's task, and he
must act in accordance with objective criteria in performing his double function of interpreting not only the rules, but also those
ideological, moral, and economic factors existing in the community at
the moment in history when the rule is applied.
The last method is the teleologial, which concerns the legislator's
main obligation (fundamentally to attend to the spirit and purpose
of the rules), and thus refers to the search and investigation of the
spirit (sense, inherent content) and the purpose (the intent, effect,
result of its application). This is not the classic search for the intent
of the legislator or of the law, but for a total focus that takes into
account all the factors and methods already mentioned and that is
directed to the harmonious attainment of a result compatible with
social reality and the ultimate purpose of the rule. This purpose should
be thought of imaginatively with a forward-looking view of the result
which must operate within the interpretative process, for, as one
author has said, the articles of a code cannot be damaged in a state
of indifference because of the results.
Alongside these methods of interpretation must be placed the
"equitable solution of the case," assuming that equity does not operate
as an autonomous source of law (being authorized only by the Civil
Code in expressly permitted cases (art. 3(2)), but as the "humanization" or balanced adjustment of the rule of the case and, also, as the
general principles of the law, being understood as carriers of the meanings of the rules of the entire legal system, in each case, according
to one of the meanings given by the Code.
As stated earlier, all of the above presupposes the existence of
a positive rule of law, whether codified or not, and that the interpretative task is confined to that rule. But it can happen, and it does
because life is much richer than even the most omniscient legislator
can foresee, that there exist what are called lacunae ("gaps") or voids.
"Lacunae" is truly a metaphorical expression, because all one does
is to enter the realist field of normative integration. There are no
lacunae because there is law. There are no lacunae because there are
judges, it has been said. The Spanish Civil Code does not admit of
them either, for it binds the judge to render a decision in all cases.
When faced with facts that have no legal rule, the judge must resort
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to custom (this having a different meaning under common law), that
is to say, the judge turns to another, unwritten rule that is in force
and whose result has been proved (art. 1(3) and, in the absence of such
a rule, the judge resorts to general principles. These principles are
either those which inspired the legal system or those which constitute
superior rules of justice that are active in the whole culture of the
country. Such a principle must have its own substance, and the judge
applies it as an autonomous source; but, in that event, because of the
curious paradox of our procedural system in regard to the effects of
an appeal, and in order to strike down the infringement of a principle
by a trial judge in a decision, that principle must have been recognized
or approved by the Supreme Court. The purpose of this rule of judgemade law is a practical one: to avoid any rule or aphorism being invoked as an infringed principle that does not have such character,
but that does not deny the autonomous virtuality of either the principle or its application by the judge.
In the absence of written law, custom, or general principles, the
judge will turn to other sources, which under Spanish law are all the
following. In Spain, it is maintained that equity, as an antonomous
source (apart from its moderating function in interpretation), can only
be applied in limited instances (for example: the law governing usury,
the law governing predial leases, amicable arbitration, etc.). Protected
by the broad limits and scope of general principles, we can apply the
rules of good sense, the nature of things, analogy, natural law, legal
"standards," or jurisprudence etc.
The subject of jurisprudence in Spain (and in countries having
codified laws in general) is a controversial one. The revision of our
Civil Code in 1974 introduced a somewhat ambiguous formula, and
to some, an unnecessary one. The Code states, in effect, that
"jurisprudence shall complement the legal system with the doctrine
which, by way of repetition, is established by the. Supreme Court in
interpreting and applying written law, custom, and the general principles of the law."
It seems to be a question of semantics between that which is complemented and that which complements, this being sufficient to reveal
its ingenuity-pure Byzantinism. In my opinion, the legal text has
done no more than to recognize the normative value of jurisprudence
within its own limits but without consecrating it as a formal source
of law. To the legal mind unaffected by our problem it is evident that
the conclusion cannot be but this: if it is not a formal source it will
of another type. I classify it as an actual dnd institutional source.
The decisions of the Supreme Court produce law-not rules, or
norms-when the justices apply legal rules or when they discover or
formulate extra-legal ones. If two or more consistent and uniform deci-
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sions are rendered by the Supreme Court they will be binding on
the Supreme Court itself and on the other judges and courts. The
latter are not formally obligated to follow the jurisprudential doctrine,
but their decisions can be set aside on appeal if such doctrine is not
followed. On the other hand, the Supreme Court can vary its jurisprudence for, among other reasons, social change, that is to say, the
Supreme Court can derogate from, or overrule, its prior decisions.
In another sense, in order for the jurisprudence to have force,
to exist mutatis mutandi, the same requisites as under common law
are required. Fundamentally, the ratio decidendi, that is, the facts
and reasons, are the same in the new case and in the jurisprudential
precedent. Obiter dictum, complementary arguments, and statements
ex abundantia, or "a mayor abundamiento" as the Spanish say, are
not binding. Because of this the jurisprudence requires that an appeal before the Supreme Court be directed at the judgment (the dispositive portion of the decision) and at its basis or grounds (the
reasons), not against the accessory arguments that do not constitute
the ratio decidendi.
In summary, it can be concluded that the methodology used by
a judge in a system of codified law is mixed; so, he must first follow
the legal rule and, in its absence, he must apply the extra-legal ones,
recreating them, and serving in this way as the viva vox iuris, as
a deliverer of the law. This is a work of creation, or if you do not
wish to give it that pompous and compromising name, of recreation.
The Continental judge, then, also makes law. Subsidiarily, in the
absence of a legal rule, but he does make it. Because of that, one
speaks of an unfolding, a judicial development of the law, which is
not in conflict with the theory of the separation of powers nor with
the essence of the judicial function. From this it follows that the interpretation of codified law is something more than a mere legal
development.
It is clear that by virtue of the normative pluralism the interpretative process has to be mixed. Fairly understood we can only
speak of interpretation in a strict sense when it is applied to written
law and custom, and even in a more particular way, because the latter
does not concern examining the meaning of a text (custom does not
appear in writing except in a very few collections, such as the Italian
Raccolte ufficiali di usi), but it involves a repeated and constant
behavior that is followed with a binding legal will. And, what are
referred to as the general principles of the law, likewise, cannot be
the object of the usual iiterpretation, because they are not, in essence
and in a technical sense, rules, but are instead general and indeterminate concepts whose appreciation is the judge's personal task and
his formal recognition of which is achieved through doctrine and the
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jurisprudence. In regard to-analogy, its application constitutes a choice,
a voluntary act by the judge (as is the case with judicial presumptions) because neither the statutes nor the Code indicates any obligation in this regard, which is reasonable if one considers the mental
process of comparison, both deduction and induction combined, that
analogy entails and because only the judge's prudence can determine
what is applicable, according to naturally objective criteria, which are
rational and suitable to the existing legal order.
CONCLUSIONS

In spite of its belonging to the Continental or system of codified
law, the Spanish legal system constitutes an open system, where the
Roman distinction between ius and lex persists. It is a pluralistic
system comprised of rules that have distinct marks and character,
rules in form and those in substance, positive rules of law and those
that are extra-positive. It is a system where the principle of normative
hierarchy prevails, with priority being given to the written law, the
general rules dictated by the parliament or legislative power, with
custom and general principles being subsidiary formal sources of law,
and with the rest, including jurisprudence, being indirect extra-positive
sources. The judge under the Spanish system is not a functionary or
bureaucrat, a mere applier of the law. The judge participates in the
creation of the law. He enjoys the freedom to apply the subsidiary
and indirect sources. The judge does not owe rigid obedience to the
rules concerning the interpretation of rules of law. The rule of interpretation is determined by each case. In the Spanish system the general principles of law constitute the safety valve of the legal order,
not only as carriers of its meaning, but also as transporters of other
possible rules which, through the work of the judge, fill the normative
voids. The judicial method of interpretation of rules is integrated more
and more in the moderate recognition of the normative effectiveness
of judge-made law, represented principally by the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court, though without implying a strict obedience to
the system of precedent.
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